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Congress enacted the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071, almost twenty years ago 
in order to guarantee that student religious clubs would have the right to meet in public 
high schools on the same terms as other noncurricular clubs. The statute followed on the 
heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), 
requiring a state university to grant student religious organizations the same rights of 
access to use campus facilities as other recognized student groups. In Widmar, the 
Supreme Court based its decision on the First Amendment's public forum doctrine and 
rejected the University's attempt to rely on the Establishment Clause to justify its 
discriminatory treatment of religious organizations. The Court specifically declined, 
however, to decide whether similar rights of access would apply in the context of public 
secondary schools. 
Congress, preferring not to wait for the Court to answer this unresolved question, 
enacted the Equal Access Act on August II, 1984 to mandate access rights at public high 
schools that receive federal financial assistance. Under its provisions, equal access 
obligations are imposed on public high schools that permit noncurricular student 
organizations to meet during noninstructional times and thereby create "limited public 
forums." 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a) and (b). Despite a narrow Congressional; purpose that 
focused on an effort to prevent discrimination against student religious clubs, the statute 
is broadly worded to prevent discrimination "on the basis of the religious, political, 
philosophical, or other content of the speech." 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a). Schools that trigger 
the statute's provisions by creating a limited public forum are required to provide equal 
access and a fair opportunity to student groups that wish to meet on school property as 
well as refrain from discrimination against such groups. The statute specifies five "fair 
opportunity criteria" so that schools are in compliance with the fair opportunity 
requirement of the statute if they require that the meetings of student groups be 
"voluntary and student initiated," refrain from sponsoring such meetings, require that 
employees of the school may be present, but not participate in meetings of student 
religious groups, preclude meetings that materially and substantially disrupt the school's 
educational activities and preclude nonschool personnel from playing a significant role in 
the group's activities. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (c). 
Since its enactment, the Equal Access Act has produced a steady stream of 
controversies. The diverse range of issues that have been raised include whether allowing 
clubs to meet during the lunch hour satisfies the statutory trigger of allowing clubs to 
meet during "noninstructional time," whether the statute creates rights in addition to the 
right to hold meetings on school premises, such as the right to distribute literature about a 
club, what constitutes a noncurricular student club, and whether the access rights created 
under the act also apply to gay and lesbian student organizations. Many of these disputes 
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are complicated by the fact that the student group bringing the legal challenge also relies 
on the First Amendment's free speech guarantee and the' public high school defending 
against the lawsuit asserts an Establishment Clause justification for its actions. 
The Supreme Court has considered issues arising under the Equal Access Act only 
once since the enactment of the statute. In 1990, in the case of Board ofEducation ofthe 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion), the 
Supreme Court both interpreted the Act's provisions and upheld it against a constitutional 
challenge based on the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In Mergens, the 
Westside High School allowed 30 student groups and clubs to meet in the school building 
after school had ended for the day. When a student group asked permission to start a 
Christian club to pray, read from and discuss the Bible and have fellowship, school 
officials rejected their request on the ground that allowing the club to meet would violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the statute, considered the meaning of the term 
"noncurriculum related student group." The Court concluded that the term should be 
broadly interpreted "to mean any student group that does not directly relate to the body of 
courses offered by the school." 496 U.S. at 239. By way of examples, tile Court was of 
the view that the practices of a student orchestra would be curriculum-related if 
participation was required for academic credit as would a French Club if the school 
included a course in French in its curriculam. By contrast, a chess club and a stamp 
collecting club would be unlikely to be curriculum-related. !d. at 240. The Court also 
considered and rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the facial validity of the 
statute. It. found that the purpose of the statute, to eliminate viewpoint-based 
discrimination against student groups, was a secular purpose and that the statute's effect, 
which was to create an opportunity for a mUltiplicity of student groups to meet at public 
high schools without significant involvement by school personnel, was similar to the 
effect in Widmar v. Vincent and was not constitutionally problematic. Id. at 247-53. 
Since Mergens, a wide array of issues have arisen over the scope of the rights created 
by the Equal Access Act. Some of the issues are made more difficult to resolve because 
of the absence of clear directions in the statute. While the statute defines the key statutory 
trigger of a "limited open forum," it does so by providing that a limited open forum is 
created when a "school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more 
noncurriculum related student groups to meet during noninstructional time." 20 U.S.C. § 
4701 (b). Unfortunately, it fails to define "noncurriculum related" and only defines 
"noninstructional time" as "time set aside by the school before actual classroom 
instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." 20 U.S.C. § 4072 (4). 
This vagueness in the statute's terms has left room for significant disagreements over 
the meaning of those terms. In some of those disputes, issues have arisen over whether a 
school has or has not limited student groups to those that are curriculum-related. 
Compare East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board ofEducation ofSalt Lake City School 
District, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Utah 1999) (finding Future Homemakers of America, 
Future Business Leaders of America and National Honor Society to be curriculum­
related) with Pope v. East Brunswick Board ofEducation, 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) 
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(holding that the Key Club, a student service organization connected with the Kiwanis, 
was not curriculum-related). In others disputes, major issues have arisen over whether the 
time used by clubs to meet is noninstmctional time or not. Some courts have limited 
noninstructional time to time before or after the school day while others have included 
times such as the lunch hour when classes are not in session. Compare Prince v. Jacoby, 
303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003) (finding that 
student/staff time is instructional time because student attendance is required even though 
no formal classroom instruction takes place during this time period) with Ceniceros v. 
Board a/Trustees a/the San Diego Unified School District, 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that lunch hour is noninstructional time). Issues have even arisen over when the 
school day begins. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School Board, 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 
2003) (finding that the school day does not include either homeroom or an activity period 
both of which occur prior to the first classroom period). 
While the focus of the Act is on the opportunity for student groups to use school 
facilities for their meetings, cases arising under the Act have also raised substantial issues 
over whether it mandates that religious clubs receive other benefits provided to student 
clubs such as opportunities to publicize the meetings and activities of a student group and 
the availability of various sources of funds made available to student groups. The 
resolution of these issues is made complicated by the fact that the statute contains 
arguably conflicting provisions on such issues. On the side of an expansive interpretation 
of access rights, the statute provides that schools may not discriminate against student 
groups. On the side of a more restricted interpretation of access rights, the statute 
contains numbers Df limitations on the statutory rights of student groups, some 
specifically applying to student religious groups and others that are more generally 
applicable. The limitations are spelled out in two sections of the statute. One section is 
the list of fair opportunity criteria that allow schools to satisfy the statutory requirements 
while imposing certain limitations on student groups. Those limitations allow schools to 
refrain from sponsoring the meetings of student groups and allow schools to require that 
school personnel be "present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity." 
20 U.S.C. § 4071 (c). In addition, the statute also contains a section that limits the 
constmction of the statute. Among those limitations is the fact that the statute must be 
interpreted not to authorize the school "to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost 
of providing the space for student-initiated meetings." 20 U.S.C. § 4041 (d). 
The Ninth Circuit in Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 62 (2003), attempted to steer a course between these two potentially 
contradictory aspects of the statute. In Prince, a student Bible club was granted only 
some of the rights available to other student clubs. In considering, a challenge based on 
both the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, the Court 
concluded that under the Equal Access Act the Bible club was entitled to participate in 
various fund-raising activities, have a club photograph appear in the yearbook at no cost, 
post flyers on bulletin boards and use the school's public address system on the same 
basis as other clubs. However, it denied the Bible Club the right to meet during 
student/staff instmctional time and the right to use school supplies, audio/visual 
equipment and school vehicles because of the funding limitation in 20 U.S.C. § 4041 (d). 
95 

Second Virginia Education Law Conference 
However, having found the statute to preclude granting such benefits to the Bible club, it 
went on to consider whether these restrictions were consistent with the free speech rights 
of the members of the Bible Club. It concluded that all of the restrictions were based on 
the viewpoint of the club and were unconstitutional under the free speech clause of the 
First Amendment. 303 F.3d at 1092. 
While the primary concern of the sponsors of the Equal Access Act was on 
discrimination against student religious groups, the language of the statute is not limited 
to the protection of such groups. The Act protects student groups generally against 
discrimination on the basis of the content of their speech. Nevertheless, until recently the 
cases that have arisen under the Act have involved access claims by religious groups. 
Several recent cases, however, have raised the rights of gay and lesbian student groups 
under the Act. The results of this group of cases have been mixed. In one case, a federal 
district court, relying on a strained interpretation of the Act, concluded that the high 
school at issue did not permit noncurriculum related student groups to meet, thereby 
denying access to the gay/straight alliance. East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of 
&/ucation ofSalt Lake City School District, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Utah 1999). By 
contrast, several courts have granted preliminary injunctions against high schools that 
refused to allow a gay/straight alliance club to meet. Boyd County High School Gay 
Straight Alliance v. Board ofEducation ofBoyd County, Kentucky, 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 
(E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin v. Orange County Ul1ified School District, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 
(C.D. Calif. 2000). 
Over its twenty-year history, the Equal Access Act has continued to spark 
controversy-. Despite a large number of court decisions that have interpreted the scope of 
the statute, those controversies have not yet subsided nor are'they likely to for the 
foreseeable future. Interpretation of the Equal Access Act is complicated by ambiguities 
in the statute's language and the complex relationship that exists between the statute and 
the First Amendment's prohibition on religious establishments combined with its 
protection for freedom of expression. The delicate constitutional balancing act that the 
statute attempts to accomplish complicates the task of statutory interpretation in a way 
that courts have still been unable to fully resolve. 
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